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I.  Introduction 
Recent innovations in agricultural industry make new products, such as Genetically Modified 
(GM) food and Organic food, available to consumers. Although various opinions on the effect of GM 
food  products  are  not  in  agreement  among  nutrition  experts,  consumers‟  concern  on  health  and 
environment  increases demand for organic food products. This study analyses the structural changes 
driven by organic food introduction into the U.S. food sector in terms of its welfare effect. According to 
the Organic Trade Association (OTA), organic food sales in the U.S. were $13.8 billion in 2005, which 
is 2.5% of total food sales. This is an increase from 1.9% in 2003 and from 0.8% in 1997. Increasing 
trends of demand are expected to continue and estimated to rise to $23.8 billion by 2010 (Nutrition 
Business Journal, 2004). Public policy also played a significant role in the expansion of organic food 
sector. The National Organic Standards, which is implemented by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) in 2002, specify the production process for processing, distributing, and growing organic food. 
The policy also restricts the use of Organic logo by allowing it only to the products whose profile meet 
the standards. Consumers are not only exposed to more information on organic standard by this policy 
adoption, but the logo also provides an easy way for consumers to recognize qualified organic products.  
As part of the organic food market, organic milk market has also been growing. According to the 
USDA, organic cow milk and soy milk drinks are the top two categories among processed organic 
products other than fresh products. Organic milk first appeared in conventional supermarkets in 1993 
and 8 conventional supermarkets were selling organic milk in 1996 (Glaser and Thompson, 2000). After 
the introduction of organic milk in the market, sales of organic milk have been growing; organic milk 
and cream sales increased from $15.8 million to $104 million, from 1996 to 2000. The industry shows a 
dramatic increase in sales during the early 2000s, which coincides with the implementation of National 3 
 
Organic Standards
1 in 2002 and a price increase of conventional milk in 2004. As of 2005, organic milk 
and cream sales were over $1billion, which is 25% up from 2004 sales. A noticeable fact is that overall 
sales of milk have remained constant since the mid -1980s, which indicates that organic milk sales not 
only increased, but also expanded in its market s hare in overall milk industry (Miller and Blayhey, 
2006). This also implies that not only new firms entered the organic milk industry during the past years, 
but also existing firms increased the supply of organic milk by recruiting and assisting convention al 
milk producers converting their product to organic milk
2. (USDA, Retail and Consumer Aspects of the 
Organic Milk Market)         
As interest in organic market grow, agricultural researchers have conducted some studies on 
organic milk. An earlier study by Glaser and Thompson (2000) considers demand for branded milk, 
private label milk and organic milk based on supermarket scanned data collected from 1988 to 1999 by 
AC Nielsen and Information Resources, Inc (IRI). According to the study, demand elasticities computed 
from nonlinear Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) framework indicate that organic milk demand is 
more elastic than private-label and branded milk. Although this analysis well describes the sensitivity of 
organic milk demand in the early stages of introduction, it cannot account for the current market analysis 
because the organic market has grown competitive to the extent that private label milk suppliers also 
produce organic milk. 
The type of consumer more likely to purchase organic products has also been of interest to 
marketing  researchers.  Lohr  (2001)  characterizes  organic  consumers  as  White,  affluent  and  well-
                                                            
1 Organic dairy products, as defined by USDA, are made from the milk of animals raised organic management. The animals 
are raised separately from the herd of conventional dairy animals. The animals are not given hormones or antibiotics. The 
animals  receive  preventive  medical  care,  such  as  vaccines,  and  dietary  supplements  of  vitamins  and  minerals.  (Recent 
Growth Patterns in the U.S. Organic Foods Market, USDA)  
 
2 To convert from conventional to organic production, the cow must be fed a diet consisting of at least 80 percent organic feed 
for 9 months and then 100 percent organic feed for 3 additional months, or must be grazed on land that is managed under a 
certified organic plan. (Recent Growth Patterns in the U.S. Organic Foods Market, USDA)  
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educated. Lohr and Semali (2000) conclude that parents of young children or infants are more likely 
than those without children to purchase organic food. Dimitri and Venezia (2007) provide descriptive 
statistics  on  the  socio  demographic  characteristics  of  organic  milk  consumers  using  2004  Nielsen 
Homescan panel. They also conclude that the typical organic milk consumer is white, well-educated and 
living in a household headed by someone younger than 50 years old, which is not different from the 
description on general organic consumers studied by others. Alviola and Capps (2008) provide a more 
formal  statistical  analysis  with  the  same  data  as  Dimitri  et  al.  implementing  Heckman  two-step 
procedure. Their conclusion largely agrees with Dimitri et al.  
However, there are very few studies on the welfare effect of the introduction of organic products. 
Dhar and Foltz (2005) estimate a demand system for recombinant bovine growth hormone (rBST) free 
labeled milk,  organic labeled milk,  and unlabeled (conventional) milk  utilizing the quadratic  AIDS 
framework  and  full  information  maximum  likelihood  estimation  techniques.  The  data  used  for  the 
analysis consist of weekly sales and prices from 1997 to 2002 in twelve cities over the U.S. They find 
that  organic  milk  and  rBST-free  milk  are  complements  to  each  other,  while  unlabeled  milk  is  a 
substitute for both rBST-free and organic milk. In addition, the amount of consumers‟ benefit from the 
specialty milks  is  analyzed through the competitive effect  (CE)  and variety  effect  (VE), where the 
former implies the amount of price reduction by existing competitors after the introduction of a new 
competitor and the latter is the willingness-to-pay changes for having more options to choose. They 
claim that consumers will benefit 2 cents per gallon by the price reduction in unlabeled milk (CE) and 
17  cents  from  the  option  of  having  rBST-free  and  organic  milk.  However,  this  research  has  some 
limitations. First,  the data and categorization used in  the analysis is  likely outdated because of the 
rapidly changing organic milk market. As mentioned above, the National Organic Standards, as well as 
many media reports on health issues, contributed to changing consumers‟ perception of organic milk. 5 
 
Hence, it is very likely that consumption behavioral patterns on organic and conventional milk changed 
after this policy. This idea can be supported by the report that more consumers have bought the higher 
premium especially after 2002 (Dimitri et al, 2005). In addition, consumers‟ concern on health risk 
changed the structure of milk market. The nation‟s largest diary process, Dean Foods, no longer sells 
rBST treated milk, and the top 3 grocery retailers, Wal-Mart, Kroger, and Costco, claimed not to sell 
such milk in their stores. Therefore, rBST treated milk is not in the product space for most of consumers 
after the early 2000s; hence, the categorization used in their study will not be valid any longer. Plus, 
rBST-free and organic variables are not from the data, created by authors. The authors state that the 
rBST-free and organic labels are recognized after interviewing with manufacturers. Second, the model 
does not control other relevant factors such as fat contents or flavor. Based on the fact that consumers‟ 
preference on fat contents has been changed, it is possible that this model over states the welfare effect 
of organic milk. Finally, the demand elasticities estimated are conditional on the expenditure of milk.  
In the early stage of introduction of organic milk, there existed only two organic milk suppliers 
in the nation, Organic Valley and Horizon Organic, and they were available in some limited areas. Thus, 
the structure of competition in milk market is rather between organic milk and non organic milk. As the 
organic milk market has expanded, however, the competitive structure has also changed to the extent 
that there are several national and local brand organic milk plus private-labeled organic milk carried by 
conventional  supermarkets.  Therefore,  in  order  to  establish  an  appropriate  analysis  of  current  milk 
market, the competition at the brand level rather than commodity group level should be taken account 
into the model.  
In this light, the objective of this study is to analyze the demand for organic and conventional 
milk at both brand level and commodity group level. A brand level milk product is defined by its fat 
contents, organic claim, flavor and the name of the supplier. A group commodity milk is defined by its 6 
 
fat contents, organic claim and flavor. Detailed explanations on categorization will be provided in the 
data section. AC Nielsen Homescan data from 2004 to 2005 is used for the study
3. The multi-stage 
demand approach is used to estimate the demand for milk products at the brand level following 
Hausman (1997). The Linear Approximate AIDS (LA/AIDS) model is adopted for the functional form 
of  demand  equations.  Unconditional  (on  the  expend iture)  elasticities  among  brands  and  group 
commodities are estimated using the methodology suggested by Carpentier et al.(2001). In addition, the 
welfare effect of the introduction of organic milk will be analyzed at both the brand and commodity 
group level.  
Previous  studies  on  brand  level  demand  analysis  are  reviewed  in  section  II  and  descriptive 
statistics  from  Nielsen  Homescan  data  are  presented  in  section  III.  Section  IV  explains  model 
specification and estimation techniques for demand analysis and the results are shown in section V, and 
the welfare analysis is provided in section VI.   
II.  Demand Estimation for Differential Goods  
1)  Classical Approach 
Researchers  have  been  interested  in  developing  methodologies  to  estimate  demands  for 
differentiated goods as disaggregated data and advanced computational devices have become available. 
For example, Hausman et al. (1994) proposed a multi-stage demand system with an application to beer 
market  and  Berry  et  al.  (1995)  introduced  mixed  logit  approach  with  an  application  to  automobile 
demand. Although the applications to disaggregated data are recent innovations, their basic ideas are 
from the existing demand approaches. 
                                                            
3 AC Nielsen established organic variable since 2002, but the data before 2004 imply that organic cow milk is not introduced 
or the consumer perceptions of organic products are lacking in the market this study focuses on. The recorded organic 
purchases are occurred in soy milk category. Therefore, the data from 2004 to 2005 are used for demand estimation and 
price values before 2004 are used to calculate the virtual price. 7 
 
Since Stone (1954) derived the very first demand system, Linear Expenditure System (LES), by 
imposing theoretical restrictions on a simple linear demand system, researchers have developed various 
functional forms of demand equations to reflect the reality better so that be able to test whether the 
theoretical  restrictions are true. Theil (1965) and Barton (1966) derived Rotterdam model (RM) by 
substituting  Slutsky  decomposition  into  a  differentiated  double  log  demand  function.  Homogeneity, 
symmetry and negativity are tested, but Barton finds that the empirical results of RM are consistent with 
theory only with the application to highly aggregated data while disaggregated applications conflict with 
theory. Different approaches that give more functional flexibility to the model were suggested by a great 
number  of  researchers  in  order  to  find  a  model  consistent  with  theory.  The  basic  idea  of  flexible 
functional forms is to approximate direct utility function, indirect utility function or cost function by 
some  specific  functional  forms  and  give  it  enough  parameters  so  that  it  is  flexible  enough  to 
approximate an arbitrary utility or cost function. The demand functions are derived through duality. 
Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1975)‟s translog model approximates the indirect utility function by a 
quadratic function of logs of normalized prices, and derive Marshallian demand by Roy‟s identity. The 
authors also test theoretical restrictions, but homogeneity does not hold for this model. Another famous 
approach known as Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) is introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980). The model is derived from the cost function of generalized Gorman polar form using Shephard‟s 
lemma. The test with this model is also inconsistent with theoretical restrictions. 
 As summarized above, a list of conventional demand systems has been developed in the past in 
efforts to find flexible functional forms that are close to reality, and those proposed models were tested 
to examine whether the models are consistent with consumer theory. Empirical evidence implies that 
currently  available  demand  models  and  data  fail  to  support  the  theoretical  restrictions.  Researchers 
appear  to  have  different  interpretation  of  the  results.  Some  researchers,  such  as  Christensen  et  al., 8 
 
conclude  that  the  theory  of  demand  does  not  hold.  But  most  researchers,  such  as  Deaton  and 
Muellbauer, carefully conclude that none of the existing models perfectly define demands and measure 
elasticies,  and  estimate  the  best  approximation  imposing  the  theoretical  restriction.  Although  the 
imposed restrictions reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, its application is very limited 
depending on the number of equations in the system.   
2)   Logit Approach 
Another approach to estimate demand will be discrete choice models. McFadden (1974) argues 
that the conventional demand approach assumes all individuals in a population have a common behavior 
rule. The logit model starts from the indirect utility functions of individuals instead of a “representative” 
utility,  taking  account  heterogeneity  of  individual  tastes.  The  indirect  utility  function  consists  of 
common utility and random utility. Based on the revealed preference theory, probability of choice can 
be  presented  as  an  integral  of  cumulated  joint  density  functions.  This  probability  directly  can  be 
interpreted as the share of demand, but it has to be transformed into a closed form of a function for 
estimation purpose. Luce (1956) derived the probability of choice formula from the conditions satisfies 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA). McFadden (1974) derived the same probability of choice 
formula under the assumption of Gumbel distribution for the error terms. 
A nice feature of logit models is that the tastes that vary systematically with respect to observed 
variables can be captured while the tastes that vary with unobserved variables cannot be handled. Also, 
the logit models solve the problem of having large number of parameters which conventional demand 
system suffers from because the indirect utility functions in discrete choice model are not defined with 
the  prices  of  all  the  products  in  the  system.  However,  the  substitutability  in  logit  models  is  very 
restrictive.  Since  logit  models  exhibit  the  independence  of  irrelevant  alternatives  (IIA)  property,  it 
constrains the cross price elasticities. The IIA claims that the ratio of choice probabilities between two 9 
 
goods  does  not  change  even  if  the  third  irrelevant  good  is  introduced.  This  might  be  a  plausible 
assumption in some cases, it is not behaviorally accurate in many cases. 
Nested logit models have been used to overcome the limitations of IIA (Ben Akiva 1973, Train 
et al. 1987). The approach is based on the assumption that consumers make decisions in sequence. 
Consumers would choose whether to  participate in  the economic activity  in  question, then select  a 
specific choice. Within each data step, the IIA assumption holds. However, across different steps, the 
ratio of probabilities can depend on the attributes of other alternatives in those nests and IIA does not 
hold. Nested logit approach is still limited in its ability to account for unobserved preferences. To relax 
the IIA assumption and account for heterogeneity, the mixed logit model is used (Train et al. 1987 and 
Berry 1995). It is an extension of standard logit that allows the coefficients to vary across individuals by 
assuming the coefficients have distributions rather than fixed numbers.       
3)  Multi-stage Demand  
Hausman et al.(1994, 2002) apply Gorman‟s multi-stage budgeting approach into the demand for 
differentiated  products.  Strotz  (1957)  discussed  that  consumers  allocate  expenditure  among  broad 
groups of commodities in the first stage of budgeting, and then allocate individual commodities within 
each group if the utility function is separable. Gorman (1959, 1971) developed Strotz‟s discussion in 
detail.  He  argues  that  „separability‟  is  not  enough  to  explain  the  consumer‟s  multi-stage  budgeting 
behavior. He shows that, under the assumption of „weak separability‟, consumers allocate their income 
into  broad  groups  of  commodities  at  higher  stage  of  budgeting  and  more  detailed  within-group 
allocation happens at lower stage. Weakly separable preferences allow the last stage demand functions 
to be presented only with the group expenditure and the prices of products within that group. However, 
in order for the higher stage demand functions to be expressed with total expenditure and the price 10 
 
indices  of  each  group,  additive  separability  and  Gorman  generalized  polar  form  of  indirect  utility 
functions, or homothetic preference is required.  
Hausman et al. apply this approach to estimate the brand level demand in beer market, whereas 
Gorman‟s original approach is conducted at the aggregate level of economy. The basic idea of this 
model is to let the top level demand corresponds to the overall demand of beer, and the middle level 
demand corresponds to the demands for different segments of beers. The lowest stage of the demand 
system corresponds to each brand of beer. The underlying assumption of separability eases the problem 
of dimensionality where the system of demand equations suffered from its numerous coefficients to 
estimate.  Weak separability is assumed at the lowest level of utility maximization problem so that the 
demand for each brand can be presented as a function of group expenditure and the prices of own and 
other  brands  in  the  same  group.  Additive  separability  is  required  at  the  higher  stage  of  utility 
maximization  in  order  for  the  higher  stage  demand  to  be  presented  as  a  function  of  total  beer 
expenditure  and  price  indices  of  segments.  Although  additive  separability  has  nice  features  which 
reduces the number of coefficients allowing the demand function to be written with group price and 
quantity indices instead of commodity prices, it is not a realistic nor plausible assumption. Hausman 
does not explicitly discuss the assumptions for the higher stage demand, but it seems that he adopts 
Carpentier and Guyomard‟s (2001) approximation of first-stage allocation process instead of imposing 
additive separability. Carpentier states that, if preferences are weakly separable and the group price 
indices  being  used  do  not  vary  too  greatly  with  the  utility  level,  allocation  between  groups  of 
commodities by two stage budgeting will be consistent with unconditional demand analysis, thus the 
first  stage  demand  function  with  price  index  can  be  approximately  rationalized  without  a  strong 
assumption.  
III.   Data 11 
 
As mentioned above, the data used in this study are the Nielsen Homescan panel data. The 
sample is selected among volunteers based on both demographic and geographic targets. Stratification is 
done by AC Nielsen to ensure that the sample matches the U.S. Census. The panelist members are 
required to scan the items purchased with handheld scanner and transfer the information to AC Nielsen 
each week. Thus, the data are recorded on a weekly basis. Unobserved data should be interpreted as 
infrequency of sales rather than infrequency of records since it is mandatory for the members to transfer 
data every week. If a member fails to comply with the rule and does not report more than a month, then 
the panelist membership is terminated. 
 The nationally representative sample consists of purchase histories of milk products by 49,114 
households from 2002 to 2005. 8,866 households participated in 2002, 18,539 households in  2003, 
40,327 and 37,338 households in  2004 and 2005 respectively. The sample contains  information  on 
demographics such as income, household size, age of head, number of child, employment, education and 
race. Demographic distributions are presented in <Table1>. Half of the sample is from under $45,000 
income class and the other half is from above $45,000 income class. More than half of the households 
consist of single or two members, and 75 percent of the sample have no children under 18. 72 percent of 
male or female household heads are employed more than 30 hours a week and 70 percent of them have 
at least college degree. The shares of organic milk purchase by different demographic characteristics are 
provided in <Table 2>. Households with small number of members tend to purchase more organic milk 
than large families, middle income class is less likely to purchase organic milk than low income and 
high income classes. Also, the data show that the households only with under-6-year-old children are 
relatively more likely to purchase organic milk than any other households.       
A  number  of  physical  product  characteristics,  weekly  market  level  prices  and  quantities 
purchased are also included in the data. Important characteristics to differentiate milk products are fat 12 
 
contents, flavor and organic claim
4. The fat contents are categorized into five types; non-fat, 1% low fat, 
2% reduced fat, whole milk and soy&lactose -free milk. Flavor is categorized into fla vored and not 
flavored. <Table 3> provides the market shares of products distinguished by these characterist ics each 
year. 2% reduced fat milk brings the largest share of milk sales up to 35% during the period, and the 
market shares of 2% milk and whole milk have decreasing trends while the shares of non -fat, low fat 
and soy&lactose-free milk have moderately increasing trends. The share of organic milk vs. non-organic 
milk also shows an increasing trend in this sample.  
In  this  study,  a  product  is  defined  at  the  brand  level  with  three  different  characteristics  of 
products;  fat  contents,  organic  claim,  flavored  or  not.  Many  kinds  of  flavors  are  consolidated  into 
flavored for simplicity. Different fat contents of a brand are treated as different products, and organic 
milk and non-organic milk of a same brand are treated as different products as well. Different brands 
with same fat  contents  and flavor and the same organic claim are, of course, regarded as different 
products.  But  different  sizes  and different  types  of containers are not  distinguished in  the products 
defined in  this  study. The commodity  groups  are aggregated across different  brands  with  the same 
characteristics.  For  example,  the  2%  reduced  fat-organic-unflavored  group  commodity  milk  is  an 
aggregation of different products within the group of 2% reduced fat-organic-unflavored milk. Hence, 
there  are  20  group  commodities  with  the  categorization  mentioned  above.  The  quantities  of  group 
commodities are the aggregation across brand level products with same characteristics and their prices 
are the price indices of each group. In terms of time frequency, weekly purchase data are aggregated into 
monthly  records  in  order  to  minimize infrequency  problem.  According  to  the  definition  of  product 
above, there exist 1,902 products in the nation. However, it is notable that specific brands of milk appear 
only  in  specific  areas  and  only  a  few  brands  dominate  the  local  markets  while  a  large  number  of 
                                                            
4 Some of variables such as fat contents and flavors are not precisely recorded so that those variables are created from the 
UPC (Universal Product Code) description. 
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residuals take only 1~5% of market share. Hence, it is concluded that the brand-level milk market is 
highly localized and dominated by a few brands so this study needs to focus on some specific market. 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel hill and Charlotte markets are chosen and brands with market share larger than 
1% are considered.  
1,634 households participated in the survey from 2002 to 2005 in RDU (Raleigh-Durham-Chapel 
hill and Charlotte) area. 103 households participated in 2002, 481 households in 2003, 1440 households 
and 1319 households in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Among the panelists, 471 households participated 
for  one  year  and  1004  households  participated  for  two  years.  There  are  80  households  and  47 
households who participated for three and four years, respectively. The demographics in this area show 
similar  features  as  the  national  demographics.  However,  although  AC  Nielsen  established  organic 
variable since 2002, the data before 2004 imply that organic cow milk is not introduced or the consumer 
perceptions of organic products are lacking in this market. The organic purchases are occurred only in 
soy milk category according to the data during 2002 and 2003. Therefore, the data from 2004 to 2005 
are used to estimate consumer demand and the welfare effects are analyzed under the assumption that 
organic cow milk is introduced in this area since 2004. The price values of conventional milk prior to 
2004 are used to calculate the virtual prices in the welfare analysis. The shares of each type of milk sales 
are described in <Table 4>.  The figures are similar to the national sample. The organic milk takes about 
2.5 percent of the milk market and the 2% reduced fat milk takes the largest share.  
There exist 249 products in the area, but only 58 products take more than 97% of the milk 
market. Hence, only the 58 products are included in this study. The products can be categorized into 20 
groups according to the characteristics mentioned above, which are fat contents, flavor and organic 
claim. Market shares and average prices of products in each group, and the number of brands with larger 
than 1% of market share within each group are shown in <Table 5>. Conventional non-flavored non-14 
 
organic milk dominates the market with 92% market share. Soy and lactose free milks are priced higher 
than cow milk among non organic milk. Organic cow milk has higher per unit prices than conventional 
cow milk as expected, but soy and lactose free milk are not priced differently between organic and non 
organic.  
IV.   Model 
1)  Multi Stage Demand System  
Hausman‟s three stage demand systems approach is adopted to estimate the demands of milk. 
The first stage demand is defined as total demand of milk; the second stage is defined as demands for 
group commodities; the third (lower) stage estimates brand level demands within groups. It is assumed 
that the direct utility function is weakly separable into sub-utilities and the current weighted true cost of 
living price indices for each groups vary only slightly with corresponding sub-utility levels so that the 
empirical variation of price index with sub-utilities can be neglected. The latter assumption allows to 
avoid strong assumptions, such as strong separability or homothetic preference, in the upper stage of 
demand system  (Carpentier and Guyomard, 2001). The econometric functional  form  of brand  level 
demand equation is specified as Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS): 
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G
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In order to estimate the group commodity demand in the second stage, Stone Index is computed 
for the price indices of each segment using mean values of market shares of each brand. LA/AIDS is 
used to specify the middle level equation. (Hausman states in his paper that the difference in functional 
form does not make difference in outcomes.) 
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m = 1, …, M,    t = 1, …, T 
where qmt is the share of segment m in period t, yBtis total milk expenditure, and  πkt is segment price 
indices in the period of t.  
The first level equation, which explains the overall demand for milk, can be specified as 
        (3)       t t t t t e Z y u           log log log 2 1 0  
where ut is overall consumption of milk, yt is disposable income, πt is price index for milk, and Zt are 
the variables that account for time trends. 
 
2)  Specification and Estimation 
As I mentioned above, data used in this study are micro-level survey data. When it comes to 
demand analysis using this type of data, one cannot avoid the issue that some products are not consumed 
by at least some economic agents in some periods. Even though the data used in this study for the lower 
level of multistage demand equation are not disaggregated as to the household level, the data are still 
disaggregated to  some  degree of brand level  and indicate zero purchases  for some brands  in  some 
periods. 
Setting aside the difficulties of estimating latent dependent variable models, missing regressor 
difficulties are first encountered because prices are not observed for non purchased products.  Three 16 
 
simple solutions for this problem are 1) to discard all incomplete observations and estimate population 
parameters using the remaining observations, 2) to use zero-order methods which substitute sample 
means for the missing values, and 3) to use first-order methods which substitute predicted values from 
simple regression for the missing values. However, these methods  are criticized because  of sample 
selection bias. Many researchers suggest various missing value procedures mostly utilizing demographic 
or  product  characteristics.  For  example,  Heckman  procedure  and  Amemiya‟s  principle  require  both 
regressands and regressors in demand systems to be endogenous so that the variability of regressors can 
be explained with other exogenous variables. However, in multi-stage demand approach, it is impossible 
to incorporate quality adjusting price equations because the assumption of separability does not allow 
volatilities in the exogenous variables that explain price variation, such as characteristics of products. 
Therefore, a simple regression method seems to be the only feasible approach to treat the missing price 
problems. The unobserved unit prices are predicted following Perali and Chavas (2000). The unit prices 
at  UPC  level  were  regressed  on  characteristics  variables,  time  variables,  regional  dummies,  and 
interaction terms between characteristics and time variables. The least square results show 0.54 of R-
square, but statistically significant coefficients. 
Another issue with regard to using micro-level purchasing data is to take the zero purchasing 
behavior of consumers into account in analysis. This indicates corner solution outcomes of consumer 
utility maximization problem, which are rational decisions of economic agents. Thus, a Tobit model is 
suggested to explain the corner solutions.   
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Assuming random utility hypothesis (RUH) and PIGLOG class utility function, the Marshallian 
uncompensated demand functions at the household level can be specified as follows: 17 
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where  n i   ...,   , 2   , 1   denotes  the i ‟s milk  product  in  the demand system,  h  denotes the household, t  
denotes  the  time  period.  jht p  is  the  price  of  product  j  household  h  faces  in  time  period t .  ht m is 











ht P  is 
the Linear Approximate AIDS price index for household h  in period t .  iht  ~  is an error term that is 
heteroscedastic within the share equation for one good and correlated across the share equations for 
different  goods.    
j jht jht i iht iht p     ln ~ .  jht   is mean zero homoskedastic error term from utility 
function. 
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Household heterogeneity   iht   might be specified as  
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Since I have aggregate data, however, the demand function above should be aggregated over 
households. Aggregating (4) over household yields 
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Therefore, heteroskedastic Tobit model with the two-step estimation approach is adopted for the lower 
stage demand estimation.  
The first and the second stage demand do not require Tobit approach because the aggregated data 
used in the higher stage do not show the evidence of corner solution outcomes. However, the error terms 
might  not  be  homoskedastic  any  longer.  Based  on  the  assumption  of  Random  Utility  Hypothesis, 
disturbances of uncompensated demand functions will be heteroskedastic according to the same logic 
provided above. Hence, the conventional  demand systems  given in  equation (2)  and (3) with SUR 
approach are adopted for the higher stage demand estimation.  
Two step estimation 
Estimating censored demand system is not an easy task because it involves multiple probability 
integrals. In the early applications (Wales and Woodland (1983), Lee and Pitt (1986, 1987)), researchers 
were only able to analyze small systems by taking multiple integrals. Because of recent development in 
simulation  techniques, researchers can numerically evaluate multiple probability integrals  and some 
alternative  methods  with  large  system  applications  are  suggested.  An  application  of  the  simulated 
maximum likelihood (SML) approach is seen in Kao, Lee and Pitt, and the quasi maximum likelihood 
(QML) approach which approximates the multivariate likelihood function with a sequence of bivariate 
function  can  be  seen  in  Yen,  Lin  and  Smallwood  (2003).  An  alternative  that  does  not  involves 
complicated computational tasks, which is known as two-step estimation, is proposed by Perali and 
Chavas  (2000)  and  later  extended  to  the  panel  data  framework  by  Meyerhoefer,  Ranney  and  Sahn 
(2005). This study adopts Meyerhoefer‟s two-step estimation because the approach is generalized to the 
application of panel data while others are applied only with cross-section data and its computational 
procedure is relatively simple comparing to other approaches. 19 
 
The basic idea of the two-stage procedure is to estimate an unrestricted heteroskedastic Tobit 
model equation by equation and find the error correlations, and then recover restricted parameters using 
the minimum distance method which falls into the GMM framework.  
In the first step, the share equation for ith product (7) can be rewritten as follow 
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0 i   is product specific fixed effect. As  iht  ~  is heteroscedastic within each equation and correlated 
across equations, so does  it  ~ . To get consistent first-step estimates, a heteroscedastic Tobit econometric 
model is employed for each equation. The variance of the error term is specified using a fairly flexible 
and general form  
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where  it z   is a   z s -dimensional vector of variables for product i in period t. Variables of t , 













log  is included because the other variables seem 
to  hamper  the  optimization  procedure  without  improving  the  goodness  of  fit  of  the  model.  As  the 
estimation is conducted for each share equation separately without imposing cross-equation parameter 
restrictions implied by demand theory, the estimates I obtain from this step are reduced form estimates. 
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i   is a   1 2    z s n  vector of reduced form parameter estimates from the i ‟s 20 
 
equation. In the second step of estimation, the cross equation restrictions implied from demand theory 
are imposed on the reduced form parameters estimated in the first step, and the structural parameters that 
are  consistent  with  demand  theory  are  calculated.  Denote  a  q-dimensional  vector  of  structural 
parameters  as  ,  then  the  structural  parameters  are  obtained  from  the  following  GMM  estimation 
procedure 
    (10)        
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where  ) ( h is a nonlinear mapping   into   that is used to impose the theoretical restrictions on the 
reduced form parameters. The number of restrictions imposed is  q n s n z     2 , which is equal to (n-
1)*n/2+n+2.  Under  the  null  hypothesis  that  these  restrictions  are  correct,  the  minimized  value  of 
objective function (10) is a chi-square distributed random variable with degree of freedom equals to the 
number of observation minus the number of restrictions.  
The difficulty arises in finding a consistent estimate of . Meyerhoefer et al. (2005) states that 
the covariance-variance matrix for 

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consistent  estimator  for    can  be  obtained  by  replacing  the  population  moments  by  their  sample 
counterparts. However, this might not work for this study because the data used in this study do not meet 
with the condition for large sample theory. These are four years‟ monthly data so that the number of 
observations for each brand is at most 48. The data for specific types of milk such as organic milk are 
established recently, thus very short strings of data are available for special types of milk. 21 
 
The  finite  sample  properties  of  GMM  estimator  seem  to  be  an  interesting  topic  among  the 
econometricians in mid 90s. The July 1996 issue of Journal of Business and Economic Statistics is full 
of  papers  on  the  small  sample  properties  of  GMM  estimator  proposing  alternatives  for  consistent 
estimator of weighting matrix. Although they are looking at slightly different issues of small sample 
properties, their conclusions converge to one that the equally weighted matrix, which is equivalent to 
identity matrix, dominates covariance matrix (or the proposed matrix) in terms of the bias of estimator 
and  over  identification  test  statistics.  (i.e.  Monte  Carlo  studies  show  that  the  estimates  are  biased 
downward and Wald test statistics often exceed asymptotic size which means relying on asymptotic 
distribution theory leads one to reject the null hypothesis too often.) Therefore, the identity matrix is 
used in this study. 
Elasticities  
The unconditional expectation for the budget shares including all the observations is  
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The uncompensated own price, cross price and expenditure elasticities that are conditional on the 
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Unconditional (on expenditure) elasticities are computed following Carpentier and Guyomard 
(2001). The relationships between second-stage (i.e., conditional) and first-stage (i.e., unconditional) 
expenditure and price elasticities are established under the assumptions of weakly separable direct utility 
function and the approximate independence of the true cost of living indices with respect to sub-utility 
levels. Carpentier and Guyomard provide formulas with two-stage budgeting application, but the results 
are generalized to the three-stage budgeting application following Edgerton (1997). 
V.  Welfare Analysis 
The total effect on consumers‟ welfare can be evaluated through compensating variation, which 
is  the  difference  in  consumers‟  expenditure  function  before  and  after  the  introduction  of  organic 
products holding utility constant at the post-introduction level: 
(14)          𝐶? = 𝑒 ?1,?𝑁,𝑟,?1  − 𝑒(?0,?𝑁
∗ (?0),𝑟,?1) 
where ?1 is the vector of post-introduction prices of existing products, ?𝑁 is the post-introduction price 
of the new product, r is a vector of prices of outside industry, and ?1 is the post-introduction utility level. 23 
 
The function ?𝑁
∗ (?) defines the „virtual‟ price for the new product, which is the reservation price where 
demand for the new product would be zero given the prices of other products. Following Hausman and 
Leonard (2002), this total benefit can be broken into two parts: 
      
(15)     𝐶? =  𝑒 ?1,?𝑁,𝑟,?1  − 𝑒 ?1,?𝑁
∗  ?1 ,𝑟,?1   + [𝑒 ?1,?𝑁
∗ ?1 ,𝑟,?1  − 𝑒 ?0,?𝑁
∗  ?0 ,𝑟,?1 ] 
 
and  written  as CV = −(VE + PE).  The  first  term,  variety  effect  (VE),  represents  the  increase  in 
consumer  welfare  due  to  the  availability  of  the  new  products,  holding  the  existing  product  prices 
constant at the post-introduction level. This effect not only captures the benefits from having more 
options but also the benefits from the new characteristics of new products. The second term, price effect 
(PE), represents the change of consumer welfare due to the change in the prices of existing products. 
The  introduction  of  new  products  can  lead  the  prices  of  existing  products  to  increase  or  decrease 
depending on the competitive structure of the industry. If the new products closely compete with the 
existing  products  produced  by  the  same  manufacturer,  the  prices  of  existing  products  may  rise. 
However, if the products compete closely with the existing products from different manufacturers, the 
prices of existing products are likely to decrease.   
Price changes from the organic milk introduction are predicted at the group commodity level and 
the whole benefits in dollar values are measured at the aggregate level of milk industry using the price 
index of whole market. First, virtual prices can be evaluated at the group commodity level by solving a 
system of second level demand equations that would set the organic group commodities‟ shares to zero. 
There are 6 organic commodity groups among the total 16 commodity groups in this application. Given 
the virtual prices, variety effect can be calculated as follows: 
(16)      ?𝐸 =  𝑒 ?1,?𝑁,𝑟,?1  − 𝑒 ?1,?𝑁
∗ ?1 ,𝑟,?1   24 
 
Hausman  (1981)  derives  straightforward  expressions  for  expenditure  functions  from 
uncompensated demand estimates in some special cases such as linear demand or log linear demand 
equations.  First,  he  simplifies  Roy‟s  identity  using  the  implicit  function  theorem.  The  simplified 
expression can be integrated out and the indirect utility function can be obtained in a closed form by 
solving an ordinary differential equation. Finally, the corresponding expenditure function is obtained 
through inverting the indirect utility function. An explicit expression for the variety effect can be derived 
in case of a double log demand equation at the top level equation: 
(17)      ?𝐸 = [
1−?1
 1+?2 ?1
?1  𝑃 ?1,?𝑁
∗  ?1  𝑒?? ?0 + ?2𝑙?𝑃 ?1,?𝑁
∗  ?1    − ?1  + ?1
1−?1]
1
1−?1 − ?1   
where p1 and pN
∗  represent the post-introduction price indices for non organic commodity groups and the 
virtual price indices for organic commodity groups. Function P(∙) defines the virtual price index for the 
milk industry in this region. ?1 is the coefficient on log personal disposable income, ?2 is the coefficient 
on the milk price index from the top level equation, and  ?0 captures the remainder of the variables in 
the  top  level  equation. ?1  is  post  introduction  personal  disposable  income  and ?1  is  actual  milk 
expenditure.  
Hausman provides two different methodologies to estimate price effects. First, one can estimate 
the price effect directly from the data using OLS methodology if both the pre- and post-introduction 
consumption  data  for  the  existing  goods  are  available.  Second,  one  can  estimate  the  price  effects 
indirectly by solving the equilibrium conditions for the assumed model of competition for the post-
introduction  world.  The  price  effects  in  this  study  are  estimated  with  the  direct  estimation  method 
because both the pre- and post-introduction data are available and the interests of this study are on 
measuring  the  realized  benefits  without  imposing  any  restrictions.  The  type  of  competition  in  this 25 
 
market is not known and assuming certain type of competition restricts the estimates. Therefore, the 
price effects are estimated by estimating the following equation: 
(18)       𝑙?𝑔?𝑖? = ?𝑖 + ?? + 𝐼𝑖?? + ?𝑖? 
The  dependant  variable  is  the  log  price  of  the  existing  conventional  milk  of  type  i  in  time  t.  The 
variables ?𝑖 and ?? are fixed effects for group i and time t. The regression is conducted separately for 
log  of  price  of  each  group  and  the  variable ?𝑖 is  defined  as  intercept. ?? are  defined  with  dummy 
variables  for  each  month.  There  are  48  months  in  the  data  and  47  dummies  are  included  in  the 
regression. 𝐼𝑖?  is  a  post-introduction  indicator. 𝐼𝑖?  equal  one  if  the  organic  milk  is  introduced.  The 
coefficient ? measures the amount of price change of existing milk after the organic milk introduction
5.  
The overall effect of the organic milk introduction on consumer welfare is the sum of the variety 
effect and the price effect. Hausman (1981) derived  the Compensating Variation in the same way he 
derived the Variety Effect: 
(19)     𝐶? = [
1−?1
 1+?2 ?1
?1  𝑃 ?0,?𝑁
∗  𝑒?? ?0 + ?2𝑙?𝑃 ?0,?𝑁
∗    − ?1  + ?1
1−?1]
1
1−?1 − ?1   
where P p0,pN
∗   is  the  milk  price  index  evaluated  at  the  pre-introduction  prices  for  the  existing 
(conventional) milks and the virtual prices for organic types of milk.  
VI.  Results 
Elasticity Estimates 
I applied the econometric approach outlined above to the A.C. Nielsen Homescan data to estimate the 
system of milk demand equations. The estimates of equation (3), top level demand function, directly 
                                                            
5  The indicator variable equals one after 2004 because consumers in this region began to purchase organic milk since 2004 
according to the data. Although organic milk was available nationwide before 2004 and surely in this region, consumers’ 
perception on organic milk seems to start from 2004 in this region. Thus, we assume the starting point of organic milk 
introduction as January 2004. 26 
 
give the own price elasticity and the income elasticity, which are -0.2 and 0.88, respectively, in the RDU 
market. The milk price index in this market is calculated with the given data, the regional disposable 
income is indirectly obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS).  
Elasticity estimates for the second stage demand system are provided from <Table 6> to <Table 
7>. The second stage demand equations are estimated both with and without the variables that account 
for time trend. The results partly conflict, but overall implications are not different between two models. 
Thus, the results with time trends are discussed in this section because the model shows better fits. The 
value of minimization objective function is smaller and the number of significant estimates at 10% level 
is larger for the model with time trends. <Table 6> and <Table 7> show conditional and unconditional 
elasticity  estimates,  respectively.  The  elasticities  are  estimated  at  the  mean  of  variables.  Statistical 
significances  are  tested  for  the  conditional  elasticity  and  we  find  108  estimates  out  of  272  are 
statistically significant at 10% level. All types of milk, except the organic-flavored soy/lactose free milk, 
show negative own price elasticity. Although the organic-flavored soy/lactose free milk has positive 
own price elasticity, it cannot be considered as Giffen goods because the estimate is not statistically 
significant. This might be caused by the imposition of homogeneity by which the coefficients of this 
group of commodity are computed.    
Cross price elasticities do not show a general pattern, but some implications can be drawn from 
the results. First, cross price elasticities between organic and conventional milk with same fat contents 
and flavor do not show evidence of substitution patterns between organic and conventional milk. 1% fat 
unflavored  organic  and  conventional  milk  have  positive  cross  price  elasticities  (17.73  and  0.22) 
implying they are substitutes for each other, whereas organic and conventional unflavored whole milk 
have negative cross price elasticities (-9.79 and -0.11) suggesting that they are complements to each 27 
 
other. 2% fat milk and soy/lactose-free milk also have negative cross price elasticities between organic 
and  conventional  although  their  conditional  elasticities  are  not  significant.  It  is  notable  that  the 
magnitude  of  substitution  is  not  symmetric  implying  that  the  amount  of  organic  milk  consumption 
change when the conventional milk price changes is larger than the amount of conventional milk change 
when the organic milk price changes. Second, cross price elasticities show possible substitution patterns 
between fat contents although it is hard to conclude that similar fat contents are always substitutes with 
one another. Within the group of conventional unflavored milk, cross price elasticities show pretty clear 
substitutability between similar fat contents. Fat free and low fat milk have significant positive cross 
price elasticities and reduced fat and whole milk also have positive cross price elasticities suggesting 
that they are substitutes. Low fat and reduced fat milk also show substitutability although their cross 
price elasticities are not significant and their magnitudes are very small. The results also imply that 
soy/lactose free milk is substitutable with fat free milk while it is not substitutable with other types of 
cow milk. Within the group of organic unflavored milk, however, elasticities imply that low fat, reduced 
fat  and  whole  milk  are  substitutes  for  one  another  although  they  are  not  statistically  significant 
according to the conditional elasticity esimates. Soy/lactose free milk and 2% fat milk are substitutes 
with each other within this group. Cross price elasticities within the group of flavored conventional milk 
show the similar substitution pattern in the unflavored organic milk group. Therefore, based on the 
analysis  above,  this  study  carefully  concludes  that  organic  milk  and  conventional  milk  are  neither 
substitute nor complements to each other, but this study rather concludes that milk with similar fat 
contents are more substitutable to each other. Further, substitution patterns between conventional and 
organic milk found in the previous aggregate level studies might be driven by the substitutability among 
fat contents rather than by organic factor.    28 
 
Elasticity estimates at the brand level are partly provided in <Table 8>. Most of brand milks are 
cross price elastic to private labeled milk, but not vice versa. In other words, the demand for brand milks 
varies a lot as the price of private label milk changes, but the demand for private labeled milk is not 
affected a lot by branded milk prices. 
Variety Effects 
Virtual prices of organic milk products are computed solving a system of equations by setting 
quantities of organic milk to zero as described in section V and the results are summarized in <Table 9>. 
The changes in the virtual prices of each type of organic milk are not consistent with the own price 
elasticity  estimates  because  the  virtual  prices  resulted  from  simultaneous  effect  of  organic  milk 
introduction.  Virtual  price  index  of  milk  industry  is  computed  at  the  original  equilibrium.  In  other 
words,  the  index  is  computed  with  the  mean  values  of  market  shares  from  post-introduction  data. 
Although the differences between actual prices and virtual prices of each type of milk are large, the 
difference in the milk market index is small because the market share of organic milk is as small as 2.5% 
on average.  
The variety effect is calculated with the formula given in section V which takes the curvatures of 
demand equations into account. The results imply that consumers in this data set obtain 838.8 dollars per 
month  in  total  by  having  organic  options  in  their  choice  sets  and  this  is  8.2  percent  of  the  milk 
expenditure. The benefit a representative consumer receives whenever he/she purchases a gallon of milk 
is 31 cents. 
Price Effects 
The coefficient estimates of equation (11) are presented in <Table 10>. The estimates show that 
the majority of prices of existing conventional milks have increased after the introduction of organic 
milk  even  though  the  magnitudes  of  increments  are  very  small,    ranging  from  0.05%  to  0.17%. 29 
 
However, the prices have decreased in the cases of 2% and whole fat unflavored milk and soy/lactose 
free flavored milk. It is hard to draw a generalized conclusion on the price effect of the competition 
structure of this market from the results because 1) the estimated price effects are very small and the 
standard errors are relatively large; 2) the directions of price effects conflict with each other; and 3) this 
model  does  not  capture  the  supply  shock  that  occurred  in  2004.  There  was  a  price  increase  of 
conventional milk in the middle of 2004 due to the shortage of raw milk production in the U.S., but this 
model cannot capture the supply shock because the periods of two events coincide. However, ignoring 
some of the imperfect aspects of the model, this study carefully reaches two possible conclusions on the 
competition effect, equivalently the price effect. First, competition is structured between the new and the 
existing products from the same manufacturers. The positive estimates of competitive effects imply 
cannibalization which is the case that the new product is manufactured by the incumbents so that the 
prices  of  existing  products  are  increased.  This  is  also  supported  by  the  fact  that  conventional 
supermarkets began manufacturing organic milk with their own labels around this time and one of two 
leading organic milk distributors, Horizon Organic, merged with a conventional dairy distributor, Dean 
Food,  in  2004.  Therefore,  the  coefficient  of  indicator  valued  one  after  2004  might  represent  the 
competition between conventional and organic milk within the same manufacturers. Second, some of the 
negative price effects for the milk with higher fat contents can be explained by the demand shocks 
caused by consumers‟ health concerns on fat contents. Health related concerns on fat contents would 
cause positive demand shock in lower fat milk market and negative shock in higher fat milk market. The 
positive shock in lower fat market would lead to the price increase in the lower fat market and the 
negative shock would result in a lower price in the higher fat milk market.  
Finally, the overall effect on consumer welfare of the organic milk introduction is calculated 
with the formula shown in section V. The compensating variation estimated with the data is 707 dollars 30 
 
per month, which accounts for about 6 percent of the milk expenditure. This number is smaller than the 
variety effects because the price effect is negative. Therefore, it can be concluded that consumers in this 
region are willing to spend as much as 8 percent of the overall milk expenditure to have additional 
choices  with  different  characteristics,  i.e.  organic  milk.  However,  this  benefit  is  depreciated  by 
competition effects. In other words, the organic milk introduction leads the prices of existing products to 
rise due to the competition structure of this market, thus the overall benefit will be less than the variety 
effect but still positive since the negative price effect is smaller than the positive variety effect. 
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18  72.74         
30,000-34,9
99  7.89 
Nine+ Memb
















                   
60,000-69,9
99  8.86                     
70,000-99,9
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<Table 2> Organic vs. Non-organic Shares by Demographics 
org 
Household Size 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
0  95.43  97.05  98.06  97.66  98.29  99.38  99.89  100  100 
1  4.57  2.95  1.94  2.34  1.71  0.62  0.11  0  0 
org 
Household Income 
3  4  6  8  10  11  13  15  16  17  18  19  21  23  26  27 
0  99.39  97.45  95.37  95.42  99.39  97.22  97.38  98.27  99.06  96.93  96.67  97.68  96.38  98.32  97.42  94.45 
1  0.61  2.55  4.63  4.58  0.61  2.78  2.62  1.73  0.94  3.07  3.33  2.32  3.62  1.68  2.58  5.55 
Org 
Age of Children  Employment  Education  Marital Status 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  9  0  1  0  1  0  1 
0  97.27  98.07  98.98  96.29  84.8  97.81  99.63  97.05  97.24  97.29  98.65  96.56  95.73  97.79 
1  2.73  1.93  1.02  3.71  15.2  2.19  0.37  2.95  2.76  2.71  1.35  3.44  4.27  2.21 
Org 
Age of Head  Race 
2.5  2.7  3.2  3.7  4.2  4.7  5.2  5.7  6  1  2  3  4 
0  99.75  96.36  98.11  97.02  97.23  98.08  96.54  97.01  97.37  97.54  94.74  96.34  99.41 
1  0.25  3.64  1.89  2.98  2.77  1.92  3.46  2.99  2.63  2.46  5.26  3.66  0.59 
 
<Table 3> Market Shares by Fat Contents and Organic Claim 
  2002  2003  2004  2005 
non-fat  23.89  24.03  24.51  27.63 
1% low fat  16.92  17.05  18.17  20.06 
2% reduced  35.19  34.68  35.80  29.51 
whole  21.41  20.78  18.28  19.00 
soy & lactose free  2.59  3.46  3.25  3.80 
non-organic  98.38  97.75  97.81  97.53 
organic  1.62  2.25  2.19  2.47 
 
<Table 4> Market Share by Fat Contents and Organic Claim in RDU 
  2004  2005 
non-fat  24.7  27.19 
1% low fat  15.2  15.38 
2% reduced  30.62  28.38 
Whole  25.4  24.44 
soy & lactose free  4.08  4.61 
Non-organic  97.5  97.23 
Organic  2.5  2.77 
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<Table 5> Description of Group in RDU 
group  Fat contents  Organic  Flavor  Share 
average price 
per fluid oz 
Number of br
ands 
1  No fat  Nonorganic  No flavor  24.59  0.028274  3 
2  1% low fat  Nonorganic  No flavor  14.66  0.028336  3 
3  2% reduced  Nonorganic  No flavor  28.59  0.029892  5 




Nonorganic  No flavor  1.67  0.048348  5 
6  No fat  Organic  No flavor  0.18  0.051564  3 
7  1% low fat  Organic  No flavor  0.12  0.048173  2 
8  2% reduced  Organic  No flavor  0.14  0.052778  3 




Organic  No flavor  0.84  0.046248  3 
11  No fat  Nonorganic  Flavored  0.26  0.050497  2 
12  1% low fat  Nonorganic  Flavored  0.3  0.037342  2 
13  2% reduced  Nonorganic  Flavored  0.6  0.054402  4 




Nonorganic  Flavored  0.56  0.041551  4 
16  No fat  Organic  Flavored  0  n.a.  0 
17  1% low fat  Organic  Flavored  0  n.a.  0 
18  2% reduced  Organic  Flavored  0  n.a.  0 




Organic  Flavored  1.32  0.045765  3 
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<Table 8> Unconditional Elasticities at the Brand Level 
 
Income  1_A  1_B  1_C  2_A  2_B  2_C  3_A  3_B  3_D  3_C  3_E 
1_A  0.94  -2.02  0.92  -0.14  0.09  1.44  0.03  -0.01  -0.21  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
1_B  0.76  0.66  -1.86  0.21  0.07  1.16  0.03  -0.01  -0.17  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
1_C  0.99  -0.07  -0.16  -1.07  0.09  1.52  0.04  -0.01  -0.23  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
2_A  2.02  0.40  4.23  0.18  -1.24  -3.65  -0.09  0.09  1.82  0.04  0.08  0.02 
2_B  0.84  0.17  1.75  0.07  -0.06  -2.13  0.13  0.04  0.75  0.02  0.03  0.01 
2_C  0.87  0.17  1.81  0.08  -0.10  -0.92  -1.12  0.04  0.78  0.02  0.03  0.01 
3_A  0.98  -0.01  -0.20  -0.01  0.03  0.41  0.01  -1.74  -0.57  -0.03  -0.10  -0.05 
3_B  0.98  -0.01  -0.20  -0.01  0.03  0.41  0.01  0.78  -3.98  0.31  0.27  0.13 
3_D  1.38  -0.02  -0.28  -0.01  0.04  0.58  0.01  -0.12  -1.84  -1.41  -0.22  0.07 
3_C  1.01  -0.01  -0.20  -0.01  0.03  0.43  0.01  0.00  -1.98  0.14  -0.82  -0.94 
3_E  0.97  -0.01  -0.19  -0.01  0.03  0.41  0.01  -0.08  -1.27  -0.01  -0.07  -1.05 
 
 
Income  4_A  2_B  4_F  4_D  4_G  4_C  4_E  5_B  5_H  5_I  5_J  5_K 
4_A  0.64  -1.40  0.44  0.04  0.01  -0.14  -0.12  -0.05  -0.02  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
2_B  0.70  0.37  -2.12  -0.05  0.18  0.01  0.28  -0.03  -0.02  -0.05  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
4_F  0.66  -0.04  -0.15  -0.68  -0.14  -0.13  -0.07  -0.06  -0.02  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
4_D  0.68  -0.02  -0.56  -0.13  -0.78  0.14  0.05  -0.01  -0.02  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
4_G  0.71  0.03  -2.11  -0.13  0.08  -1.15  -0.18  -0.10  -0.02  -0.05  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
4_C  0.69  -0.05  -0.09  0.02  -0.04  -0.02  -1.16  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
4_E  0.66  -0.02  -0.24  0.01  0.00  0.01  -0.03  -1.00  -0.02  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
5_B  2.44  -0.04  -1.04  -0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.09  -0.02  -2.52  -2.50  -0.47  -0.94  -0.82 
5_H  1.29  -0.02  -0.55  -0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.01  -0.48  -2.26  -0.36  -0.45  -0.28 
5_I  2.45  -0.04  -1.05  -0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.09  -0.02  -1.53  -2.51  -1.48  -0.94  -0.82 
5_J  2.46  -0.04  -1.05  -0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.09  -0.02  -1.54  -2.53  -0.48  -1.95  -1.82 
5_K  2.42  -0.04  -1.04  -0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.09  -0.02  -1.51  -2.48  -0.47  -0.93  -1.81 
 
*** Numbers represent groups and Alphabets represent brands; Alphabet B represents supermarket labels.   39 
 
 
(continue Table 8) 
 
Income  6_B  6_L  6_M  7_L  7_M  8_B  8_L  8_M  9_B  9_L  9_N  9_M  10_B  10_O  10_M 
6_B  0.81  -1.39  -4.11  -0.51  -1.74  -0.71  -0.03  -0.10  -0.07  0.14  0.77  0.10  0.07  -0.17  -2.68  -0.42 
6_L  1.61  -3.78  -5.42  -2.83  -3.47  -1.41  -0.06  -0.20  -0.14  0.29  1.55  0.20  0.15  -0.34  -5.35  -0.84 
6_M  0.99  -0.56  -4.71  -2.13  -2.14  -0.87  -0.03  -0.12  -0.08  0.18  0.95  0.12  0.09  -0.21  -3.30  -0.52 
7_L  1.00  -0.96  -5.92  -0.79  -5.17  -1.85  0.21  0.76  0.53  0.23  1.22  0.16  0.12  -0.21  -3.35  -0.52 
7_M  0.99  -0.95  -5.90  -0.78  -4.17  -2.82  0.21  0.75  0.52  0.23  1.22  0.16  0.12  -0.21  -3.34  -0.52 
8_B  0.98  -0.05  -0.29  -0.04  0.64  0.26  -0.96  -0.23  0.16  0.10  0.53  0.07  0.05  0.23  3.60  0.56 
8_L  1.01  -0.05  -0.29  -0.04  0.66  0.27  0.07  -1.05  -0.08  0.10  0.54  0.07  0.05  0.24  3.70  0.58 
8_M  1.10  -0.05  -0.32  -0.04  0.72  0.29  0.14  0.04  -1.33  0.11  0.59  0.08  0.06  0.26  4.04  0.63 
9_B  0.61  0.29  1.78  0.24  0.82  0.33  0.12  0.42  0.29  -3.23  -1.28  2.68  2.78  -0.02  -0.26  -0.04 
9_L  0.55  0.26  1.60  0.21  0.74  0.30  0.11  0.38  0.26  -0.13  -1.72  -0.15  -0.19  -0.01  -0.23  -0.04 
9_N  1.70  0.80  4.97  0.66  2.30  0.93  0.33  1.17  0.81  -0.70  -4.05  -1.63  -0.45  -0.05  -0.71  -0.11 
9_M  0.55  0.26  1.62  0.21  0.75  0.30  0.11  0.38  0.26  -0.06  -1.01  0.16  -1.31  -0.01  -0.23  -0.04 
10_B  1.27  -0.19  -1.16  -0.15  -0.42  -0.17  0.15  0.54  0.37  -0.01  -0.05  -0.01  0.00  -0.69  -1.01  0.19 
10_O  1.06  -0.16  -0.96  -0.13  -0.35  -0.14  0.13  0.45  0.31  -0.01  -0.04  -0.01  0.00  0.05  -1.37  0.05 
10_M  1.21  -0.18  -1.10  -0.15  -0.40  -0.16  0.14  0.51  0.36  -0.01  -0.05  -0.01  0.00  -0.80  2.44  -2.50 
 
 
Income  11_P  11_Q  12_B  12_D  13_B  13_P  13_R  13_Q  14_B  14_C  14_E  14_S  14_T 
11_P  0.11  -0.61  0.37  -0.03  -0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.03  -0.07  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
11_Q  1.01  0.21  -2.49  -0.25  -0.14  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.25  -0.62  -0.28  -0.05  -0.13  -0.07 
12_B  -0.07  -0.02  -0.40  -2.47  1.78  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.35  -1.56  -0.70  -0.12  -0.34  -0.19 
12_D  -0.13  -0.04  -0.71  0.69  -1.92  0.10  0.12  0.07  0.61  -2.77  -1.24  -0.22  -0.60  -0.33 
13_B  0.93  0.00  0.09  0.08  0.05  -0.99  0.14  -0.02  -0.01  0.79  0.35  0.06  0.17  0.09 
13_P  0.91  0.00  0.09  0.08  0.04  -0.13  -1.44  0.46  0.17  0.77  0.34  0.06  0.17  0.09 
13_R  1.02  0.00  0.10  0.09  0.05  0.01  0.16  -1.04  -0.18  0.86  0.39  0.07  0.19  0.10 
13_Q  0.99  0.00  0.10  0.08  0.05  -0.04  -0.04  0.14  -1.07  0.83  0.37  0.07  0.18  0.10 
14_B  1.17  -0.01  -0.15  -0.25  -0.14  0.09  0.10  0.06  0.53  -1.82  -0.07  0.06  -0.13  -0.15 
14_C  1.30  -0.01  -0.17  -0.27  -0.15  0.10  0.11  0.06  0.59  -0.65  -1.38  -0.07  -0.15  -0.08 
14_E  1.30  -0.01  -0.17  -0.27  -0.15  0.10  0.11  0.06  0.59  -0.66  -0.36  -1.07  -0.17  -0.09 
14_S  1.45  -0.01  -0.19  -0.31  -0.17  0.11  0.13  0.07  0.66  -0.83  -0.33  -0.07  -1.26  -1.14 






















































































































































































































































        
  41 
 
<Table 10> Price Effects 
group  post-introduction  intercept  r-squared 
fat free unflavored non-organic 
0.08 %  -3.74 % 
0.30 
(0.20%)  (0.14%) 
1% fat unflavored non-organic 
0.05 %  -3.75 % 
0.23 
(0.14%)  (0.10%) 
2% fat unflavored non-organic 
-0.17 %  -3.47 % 
0.10 
(0.16%)  (0.12%) 
whole fat unflavored non-organic 
-0.09 %  -3.38 % 
0.13 
(0.14%)  (0.10%) 
soy/lactose free unflavored non-organic 
0.10 %  -3.29 % 
0.08 
(0.11%)  (0.08%) 
fat free flavored non-organic 
0.13 %  -3.12 % 
0.57 
(0.18%)  (0.13%) 
1% fat flavored non-organic 
0.17 %  -3.40 % 
0.15 
(0.42%)  (0.30%) 
2% fat flavored non-organic 
0.06 %  -3.08 % 
0.20 
(0.21%)  (0.15%) 
whole fat flavored non-organic 
0.10 %  -3.05 % 
0.21 
(0.13%)  (0.09%) 
soy/lactose free flavored non-organic 
-0.08 %  -3.07 % 
0.09 
(0.29%)  (0.20%) 
 
 